How the Church Teaches

One may expect, or at least hope, that agreement on how the church teaches will lead to agreement on what she teaches.  Since those who oppose baptism of desire acknowledge the church’s authority to teach, it is fitting to begin with a discussion of how she teaches.

Table of Contents

Summary

Supernatural Revelation

Faith and Reason

The Church’s Role in Teaching

The Role of Doctrinal Definitions

Unity of the Church

The Scope of Faith and Morals

The Scope of Catholic Assent

The Galileo Episode

Summary

The church teaches by her legitimate pastors.  These include the pope, the bishops in communion with him, and the priests whom they authorize to teach the faithful.  These pastors have a divine commission and authority to teach and govern all nations in matters of religion, so all men are obligated to believe and obey them.

Individual pastors can be mistaken or unfaithful in their teaching.  To prevent this from corrupting Catholic doctrine, the church has two ways of infallibly declaring her true teachings: (1) the universal ordinary magisterium, which is the common and constant teaching of her bishops, in union with the pope; (2) the ex cathedra doctrinal definitions of the pope, whether given independently or through an ecumenical council.  The universal ordinary magisterium vouches for the certainty of doctrines that have never been called into question, and the extraordinary papal magisterium serves mainly to condemn doctrinal errors as they arise.

In the normal course of events, most Catholics learn their religion from priests, catechisms and spiritual books, and fellow Catholics.  None of these are infallible per se, but they generally may be trusted to convey what the church does infallibly teach.  Catholics may presume that what they hear from these sources is orthodox, unless there is reason to suspect otherwise.

Catholic faith and submission to the church are reasonable acts involving the intellect, so they require some understanding of what is believed.  Mere parroting of words does not suffice; parrots cannot make acts of faith and charity.  The Catholic believer must do his part to maintain a sound faith, and this means consciously working to settle all the facts and principles of his religion into a coherent picture.

The church requires that Catholics assent to all her teachings, but not necessarily to know them all explicitly.  It is sufficient for each to learn what he must know to fulfill the duties of his state in life, and to believe the others implicitly by accepting that all the church teaches is true.

Many, but not all, of the doctrines that Catholics must believe are infallibly certain, either because they are proposed by the church as divinely revealed, or because they are so closely related to a doctrine of divine revelation that they must be true.  The church also requires that Catholics believe some doctrines that are not infallibly certain, namely, the (1) decisions of Pontifical Congregations, and (2) those doctrines held by common and constant consent of Catholics as theologically certain.  The high degree of authority, learning and consideration with which such doctrines are proposed makes it reasonable to assent to them, and thus appropriate for the church to require assent.  In the most unlikely event that a Catholic were to know such a doctrine to be mistaken, he would not be obliged to believe it, as this would be impossible for him.  But probably no such instance has ever occurred.  It should not have occurred even in the Galileo controversy, because the Inquisition condemned not heliocentrism, but the teaching of it as certain before it was demonstrated, as is explained below.

Most Catholics lack the scholarship to place each teaching of the church into its theological category, such as defined as of divine faith, of ecclesiastical faith, theologically certain, Catholic doctrine — but these distinctions are not necessary in practice.  It is sufficient for most Catholics to give a true assent, both internal and external, to all they have been taught by the church, and to know that most of this is infallible and thus absolutely unalterable.

It is possible to mistake what the church teaches and still have the Catholic faith, if one believes the basic dogmas and submits to the church’s doctrinal authority.  Of course a good Catholic tries to avoid such mistakes.

The deposit of public revelation was completed by the death of St. John the Evangelist, who lived longest on earth of all the Apostles.  The church does not and cannot teach any new doctrine, but rather is divinely assisted to preserve what was revealed once and for all.  Catholics — including theologians — are not free to make up new doctrines that conflict with something traditionally taught by the church, whether or not it has been defined ex cathedra by a pope.  The only new work concerning doctrine is to explain it more vividly, to show the harmony of its relations, and to trace out its implications.

If a Catholic is taught something that conflicts with prior teaching, or is faced with events that seem incompatible with Catholic doctrine, he must study and inquire to resolve the difficulty, always aiming to believe the doctrine that is best attested by legitimate Catholic authorities, and most consistent with Scripture and tradition.  In such a difficulty, he should often recall and reaffirm his intention to believe all that the church teaches.

This summary of how Catholics should form their beliefs should agree with the following sources, which explain the matter in more detail.

Supernatural Revelation

Vatican Council, Of Revelation, Sess. 3, Chap. 2, 1870 (quoted in Manning, The Vatican Council and its Definitions, 1871, pp. 210-11; Denz. 1785-88)

The same Holy Mother Church holds and teaches that God, the beginning and end of all things, may be certainly known by the natural light of human reason, by means of created things; “for the invisible things of Him from the creation of the world are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made” (Romans i. 20), but that it pleased His wisdom and bounty to reveal Himself, and the eternal decrees of His will, to mankind by another and a supernatural way: as the Apostle says, “God, having spoken on divers occasions, and many ways, in times past, to the fathers by the prophets; last of all, in these days, hath spoken to us by His Son” (Hebrews i. 1, 2).

It is to be ascribed to this divine revelation, that such truths among things divine as of themselves are not beyond human reason, can, even in the present condition of mankind, be known by every one with facility, with firm assurance, and with no admixture of error.  This, however, is not the reason why revelation is to be called absolutely necessary; but because God of His infinite goodness has ordained man to a supernatural end, viz., to be a sharer of divine blessings which utterly exceed the intelligence of the human mind; for “eye hath not seen, nor ear heard, neither hath it entered into the heart of man, what things God hath prepared for them that love Him” (1 Cor. ii. 9).

Further, this supernatural revelation, according to the universal belief of the Church, declared by the Sacred Synod of Trent, is contained in the written books and unwritten traditions which have come down to us, having been received by the Apostles from the mouth of Christ himself, or from the Apostles themselves, by the dictation of the Holy Spirit, have been transmitted, as it were, from hand to hand.  And these books of the Old and New Testament are to be received as sacred and canonical, in their integrity, with all their parts, as they are enumerated in the decree of the said Council, and are contained in the ancient Latin edition of the Vulgate.  These the Church holds to be sacred and canonical, not because, having been carefully composed by mere human industry, they were afterwards approved by her authority, nor merely because they contain revelation, with no admixture of error, but because, having been written by the inspiration of the Holy Ghost, they have God for their author, and have been delivered as such to the Church herself.

And as the things which the Holy Synod of Trent decreed for the good of souls concerning the interpretation of Divine Scripture, in order to curb rebellious spirits, have been wrongly explained by some, We, renewing the said decree, declare this to be their sense, that, in matters of faith and morals, appertaining to the building up of Christian doctrine, that is to be held as the true sense of Holy Scripture which our Holy Mother Church hath held and holds, to whom it belongs to judge of the true sense and interpretation of the Holy Scripture; and therefore that it is permitted to no one to interpret the Sacred Scripture contrary to this sense, nor, likewise, contrary to the unanimous consent of the Fathers.

Faith and Reason

Vatican Council, Of Faith and Reason, Sess. 3, Chap. 4, 1870 (quoted in Manning, The Vatican Council and its Definitions, 1871, pp. 214-17; Denz. 1795-1800)

The Catholic Church, with one consent has also ever held and does hold that there is a two-fold order of knowledge distinct both in principle and also in object; in principle, because our knowledge in the one is by natural reason, and in the other by divine faith; in object, because, besides those things to which natural reason can attain, there are proposed to our belief mysteries hidden in God, which, unless divinely revealed, cannot be known.  Wherefore the Apostle, who testifies that God is known by the gentiles through created things, still, when discoursing of the grace and truth which come by Jesus Christ (John i. 17) says: “We speak the wisdom of God in a mystery, a wisdom which is hidden, which God ordained before the world unto our glory; which none of the princes of this world knew … but to us God hath revealed them by His Spirit.  For the Spirit searcheth all things, yea, the deep things of God” (1 Cor. ii. 7-9).  And the only-begotten Son himself gives thanks to the Father, because He has hid these things from the wise and prudent, and has revealed them to little ones (Matt. xi. 25).

Reason, indeed, enlightened by faith, when it seeks earnestly, piously, and calmly, attains by a gift from God some, and that a very fruitful, understanding of mysteries; partly from the analogy of those things which it naturally knows, partly from the relations which the mysteries bear to one another and to the last end of man; but reason never becomes capable of apprehending mysteries as it does those truths which constitute its proper object.  For the divine mysteries by their own nature so far transcend the created intelligence that, even when delivered by revelation and received by faith, they remain covered with the veil of faith itself, and shrouded in a certain degree of darkness, so long as we are pilgrims in this mortal life, not yet with God; “for we walk by faith and not by sight” (2 Cor. v. 7).

But although faith is above reason, there can never be any real discrepancy between faith and reason, since the same God who reveals mysteries and infuses faith has bestowed the light of reason on the human mind, and God cannot deny Himself, nor can truth ever contradict truth.  The false appearance of such a contradiction is mainly due, either to the dogmas of faith not having been understood and expounded according to the mind of the Church, or to the inventions of opinion having been taken for the verdicts of reason.  We define, therefore, that every assertion contrary to a truth of enlightened faith is utterly false.  Further, the Church, which, together with the Apostolic office of teaching, has received a charge to guard the deposit of faith, derives from God the right and the duty of proscribing false science, lest any should be deceived by philosophy and vain fallacy (Coloss. ii. 8).  Therefore all faithful Christians are not only forbidden to defend, as legitimate conclusions of science, such opinions as are known to be contrary to the doctrines of faith, especially if they have been condemned by the Church, but are altogether bound to account them as errors which put on the fallacious appearance of truth.

And not only can faith and reason never be opposed to one another, but they are of mutual aid one to the other; for right reason demonstrates the foundations of faith, and enlightened by its light, cultivates the science of things divine; while faith frees and guards reason from errors, and furnishes it with manifold knowledge.  So far, therefore, is the Church from opposing the cultivation of human arts and sciences, that it in many ways helps and promotes it.  For the Church neither ignores nor despises the benefits of human life which result from the arts and sciences, but confesses that, as they came from God, the Lord of all science, so, if they be rightly used, they lead to God by the help of His grace.  Nor does the Church forbid that each of these sciences in its sphere should make use of its own principles and its own method; but, while recognizing this just liberty, it stands watchfully on guard, lest sciences, setting themselves against the divine teaching, or transgressing their own limits, should invade and disturb the domain of faith.

For the doctrine of faith which God hath revealed has not been proposed,like a philosophical invention, to be perfected by human ingenuity, but has been delivered as a divine deposit to the Spouse of Christ, to be faithfully kept and infallibly declared.  Hence also, that meaning of the sacred dogmas is perpetually to be retained which our Holy Mother the Church has once declared; nor is that meaning ever to be departed from, under the pretense or pretext of a deeper comprehension of them.  Let, then, the intelligence, science, and wisdom of each and all, of individuals and of the whole Church, in all ages and an times, increase and flourish in abundance and vigor; but simply in its own proper kind, that is to say, in one and the same doctrine, one and the same sense, one and the same judgment (Vincent. of Lerins, Common. n. 28).

The Church’s Role in Teaching

Catechism of the Council of Trent, trans. Donovan, pp. 13-15

Such is the nature of the human mind, so limited are its intellectual powers, that, although by means of diligent and laborious inquiry it has been enabled of itself to investigate and discover many divine truths; yet guided solely by its own lights it could never know or comprehend most of those things by which eternal salvation, the principal end of man’s creation and formation to the image and likeness of God, is attained.  “The invisible things of God, from the creation of the world, are,” as the Apostle teaches, “clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made: his eternal power also and divinity.”  But “the mystery which had been hidden from ages and generations” so transcends the reach of man’s understanding, that were it not “manifested to his saints to whom God,” by the gift of faith, “would make known the riches of the glory of this mystery, amongst the Gentiles, which is Christ,” it had never been given to human research to aspire to such wisdom.

But, as “faith cometh by hearing,” the necessity of the assiduous labor and faithful ministry of a legitimate teacher, at all times, towards the attainment of eternal salvation is manifest, for it is written, “how shall they hear without a preacher?  And how shall they preach unless they be sent?”  And, indeed, never, from the very creation of the world, has God most merciful and benignant been wanting to his own; but “at sundry times and in divers manners spoke, in times past, to the Fathers by the Prophets;” and pointed out, in a manner suited to the times and circumstances, a sure and direct path to the happiness of heaven.  But, as he had foretold that he would give a teacher, “to be the light of the Gentiles and salvation to the ends of the earth;” “in these days he hath spoken to us by his Son,” whom also by a voice from heaven, “from the excellent glory,” he has commanded all to hear and to obey; and the Son “hath given some apostles, and some prophets, and others evangelists, and others pastors and teachers,” to announce the word of life; that we be not carried about like children with every wind of doctrine, but holding fast to the firm foundation of the faith, “may be built together into a habitation of God in the Holy Ghost.”

That none may receive the word of God from the ministers of the Church as the word of man, but as the word of Christ, what it really is; the same Savior has ordained that their ministry should be invested with such authority that he says to them; “he that hears you, hears me; and he that despises you, despises me;” a declaration which he would not be understood to make to those only to whom his words were addressed, but likewise to all who, by legitimate succession, should discharge the ministry of the word, promising to be with them “all days, even to the consummation of the world.”

The Role of Doctrinal Definitions

Cardinal Manning, The Vatican Council and its Definitions, 1871, pp. 47-48

The history of the Faith cannot be adequately written without writing both the history of heresy and the history of definitions; for heresies are partial aberrations from the truth, and definitions are rectifications of those partial errors.  But the Faith is co-extensive with the whole Revelation of Truth; and though every revealed truth is definite and precise, nevertheless, all are not defined.  The need of definition arises when any revealed truth has been obscured or denied.  The general history of the Church will therefore give the general history of the Faith; but the history of Councils will give chiefly, if not only, the history of those parts of revelation which have been assailed by heresy and protected by definition.

The Divine Tradition of the Church contains truths of the supernatural order which without revelation could not have been known to man, such as the Incarnation of God and the mystery of the Holy Trinity, and truths of the natural order, which are known also by reason, such as the existence of God.  The circumference of this Divine Tradition is far wider than the range of definitions.  The Church guards, teaches, and transmits the whole divine tradition of natural and supernatural truth, but defines only those parts of the deposit which have been obscured or denied.

Cardinal Manning, The Four Great Evils of the Day, 1872, pp. 38-40

There was growing up in the minds of some men a disposition, which, I am happy to say, is nearly cast out again, to diminish and to explain away, to understate and reduce to a minimum that which Catholics ought to believe and to practice.  This spirit began in Germany.  It says: “I believe everything which the Church has defined.”  I believe all dogmas; everything which has been defined by a General Council.”  This sounds a large and generous profession of faith; but they forgot that whatsoever was revealed on the day of Pentecost to the Apostles, and by the Apostles preached to the nations of the world, and has descended in the full stream of universal belief and constant tradition, though it has never been defined, is still matter of Divine faith.  Thus there are truths of faith which have never been defined; and they have never been defined because they have never been contradicted.

They are not defined because they have not been denied.  The definition of the truth is the fortification of the Church against the assaults of unbelief.  Some of the greatest truths of revelation are to this day undefined.  The infallibility of the Church has never been defined.  The infallibility of the Head of the Church was only defined the other day.  But the infallibility of the Church, for which every Catholic would lay down his life, has never been defined until now; the infallibility of the Church is at this moment where the infallibility of the Pope was at this time last year: an undefined point of Christian revelation, believed by the Christian world, but not yet put in the form of a definition.  When, therefore, men said they would only believe dogmas, and definitions by General Councils, they implied, without knowing it, that they would not believe in the infallibility of the Church.  But the whole tradition of Christianity comes down to us on the universal testimony and the infallibility of the Church of God; which, whether defined or not, is a matter of Divine faith.

Unity of the Church

Cardinal Manning, The Vatican Council and its Definitions, 1871, pp. 112-13

1.  It is de fide,or matter of faith, that the head of the Church, as such, can never be separated, either from the Ecclesia docens, or the Ecclesia discens; that is, either from the Episcopate or from the faithful.

To suppose this, would be to deny the perpetual indwelling office of the Holy Ghost in the Church, by which the mystical body is knit together; the head to the Body, the Body to the head, the members to each other; and to “dissolve Jesus,” (St. John iv. 3) that is, to destroy the perfect symmetry and organization which the Apostle describes as the body of Christ; and St. Augustine speaks of as “one man, head and body, Christ and the Church a perfect man.”  On this unity all the properties and endowments of the Church depend; indefectibility, unity, infallibility.  As the Church can never be separated from its invisible Head, so never from its visible head.

2.  Secondly, it is matter of faith that the Ecclesia docens or the Episcopate, to which, together with Peter, and as it were, in one person with him, the assistance of the Holy Ghost was promised, can never be dissolved; but it would be dissolved if it were separated from its head.  Such separation would destroy the infallibility of the Church itself.  The Ecclesia docens would cease to exist; but this is impossible, and without heresy cannot be supposed.

3.  Thirdly, it is also matter of faith that not only no separation of communion, but even no disunion of doctrine and faith between the Head and the Body, that is, between the Ecclesia docens and discens, can ever exist.  Both are infallible; the one actively, in teaching, the other passively, in believing; and both are therefore inseparably, because necessarily, united in one faith.  Even though a number of bishops should fall away, as in the Arian and Nestorian heresies, yet the Episcopate could never fall away.  It would always remain united, by the indwelling of the Holy Ghost, to its head; and the reason of this inseparable union is precisely the infallibility of its head.  Because its head can never err, it, as a body, can never err.  How many soever, as individuals, should err and fall away from the truth, the Episcopate would remain, and therefore never be disunited from its head in teaching or believing.  Even a minority of the Bishops united to the head, would be the Episcopate of the Universal Church.  They, therefore, and they only, teach the possibility of such a separation, who assert that the Pontiff may fall into error.

See also: Pope Leo XIII, Satis Cognitum, 1896

Scope of Faith and Morals

Cardinal Manning, The Vatican Council and its Definitions, 1871, pp. 65-66, 72-85

The great commission or charter of the Church is, in the words of our Lord, “Go ye, therefore, and teach all nations … teaching them to observe all things whatsoever I have commanded you; and behold, I am with you all days, even to the consummation of the world.” (St. Matthew xxviii. 19, 20)

In these words are contained five points.

1. First, the perpetuity and universality of the mission of the Church as the teacher of mankind.

2. Secondly, the deposit of the Truth and of the commandments, that is, of the Divine Faith and law entrusted to the Church.

3. Thirdly, the office of the Church, as the sole interpreter of the Faith and of the Law.

4. Fourthly, that it has the sole Divine jurisdiction existing upon earth, in matters of salvation, over the reason and will of man.

5. Fifthly, that in the discharge of this office our Lord is with His Church always, and to the consummation of the world.

The doctrine of faith and the doctrine of morals are here explicitly described.  The Church is infallible in this deposit of revelation.  And in this deposit are truths and morals both of the natural and of the supernatural order; for the religious truths and morals of the natural order are taken up into the revelation of the order of grace, and form a part of the object of infallibility.

1. The phrase, then, “faith and morals,” signifies the whole revelation of faith; the whole way of salvation through faith; or the whole supernatural order, with all that is essential to the sanctification and salvation of man through Jesus Christ.

Now, this formula is variously expressed by the Church and by theologians; but it always means one and the same thing … namely, that the Church has an infallible guidance in treating of all matters of faith, morals, piety, and the general good of the Church.

The object of infallibility, then, is the whole revealed Word of God, and all that is so in contact with revealed truth, that without treating of it, the Word of God could not be guarded, expounded, and defended.  As, for instance, in declaring the Canon and authenticity and true interpretation of Holy Scripture, and the like.

Further, it is clear that the Church has an infallible guidance, not only in all matters that are revealed, but also in all matters which are opposed to revelation.  For the Church could not discharge its office as the Teacher of all nations, unless it were able with infallible certainty to proscribe doctrines at variance with the word of God.

From this, again, it follows that the direct object of infallibility is the Revelation, or Word, of God ; the indirect object is whatsoever is necessary for its exposition or defense, and whatsoever is contrariant to the Word of God, that is, to faith and morals.  The Church having a divine office to condemn errors in faith and morals, has therefore an infallible assistance in discerning and in proscribing false philosophies and false science.  Under this head comes the condemnation of heretical texts, such as the Three Chapters proscribed in the Fifth Council, the “Augustinus” of Jansenius, and the like; and also censures, both greater and less, those, for instance, of heresy and of error, because of their contrariety to faith; those also of temerity, scandal, and the like, because of their contrariety to morals at least.

2. It is therefore evident that the doctrinal authority of the Church is not confined to matters of revelation, but extends also to positive truths which are not revealed, whensoever the doctrinal authority of the Church cannot be duly exercised in the promulgation, explanation, and defense of revelation without judging and pronouncing on such matters and truths.  This will be clear from the following propositions:

(1.) First, the doctrinal authority of the Church is infallible in all matters and truths which are necessary to the custody of the Depositum.

This extends to certain truths of natural science, as, for example, the existence of substance; and to truths of the natural reason, such as that the soul is immaterial; that it is “the form of the body;” and the like.  It extends also to certain truths of the supernatural order, which are not revealed; as, the authenticity of certain texts or versions of the Holy Scripture.

The Council of Trent by a dogmatic decree declared, under anathema, that the Vulgate edition is authentic.  Now this is a definition or dogmatic judgment, to be believed on the infallible authority of the Church.  But this truth or fact is not revealed.

(2.) Secondly, there are truths of mere human history, which therefore are not revealed, without which the deposit of the Faith cannot be taught or guarded in its integrity.  For instance; that St. Peter was Bishop of Rome; that the Council of Trent and the Council of the Vatican are Ecumenical, that is, legitimately celebrated and confirmed; that Pius IX. is the successor of Peter by legitimate election.  These truths are not revealed.  They have no place in Scripture; and except the first, they have no place in tradition; yet they are so necessary to the order of faith, that the whole would be undermined if they were not infallibly certain.  But such infallible certainty is impossible by means of human history and human evidence alone.  It is created only by the infallible authority of the Church.

(3.) Thirdly, there are truths of interpretation, not revealed, without which the deposit of the faith cannot be preserved.

The Council of Trent declares that to the Church it belongs to judge of the true sense and interpretation of Holy Scripture.  Now the sense of the Holy Scripture is two-fold; namely, the literal and grammatical, or, as it is called, the sensus quis; and the theological and doctrinal, or the sensus qualis.  The Church judges infallibly of both.  It judges of the question that such and such words or texts have such and such literal and grammatical meaning.  It judges also of the conformity of such meaning with the rule of faith, or of its contradiction to the same.  The former is a question of fact, the latter of dogma.  That the latter falls within the infallible judgment of the Church has been denied by none but heretics.  The former has been denied, for a time, by some who continued to be Catholics: for this is, in truth, the question of dogmatic facts.  But the Jansenists never ventured to extend their denial to the text of Scripture, though the argument is one and the same.  The Church has the same assistance in judging of the grammatical and theological sense of texts, whether sacred or simply human: and has exercised it in all ages.

For instance: Pope Hormisdas says, “The venerable wisdom of the Fathers providently defined by faithful ordinance what doctrines are Catholic: fixing also certain parts of the ancient books to be received as of authority, the Holy Ghost so instructing them; lest the reader, indulging in his own opinion … should assert not that which tends to the edification of the Church, but what his own pleasure had conceived.”

Pope Nicholas I. writes, “by, their decree (i.e. that of the Roman Pontiffs) the writings of other authors are approved or condemned, so that what the Apostolic See approves, is to be held at this day, and what it has rejected, is to be esteemed of no effect,” etc.

Pope Gelasius, in a Council held at Rome, decreed as follows: “Also the writings of Caecilius Cyprianus, Martyr, Bishop of Carthage, are in all things to be received; also the writings of Blessed Gregory, Bishop of Nazianzum … also the writings and treatises of all orthodox Fathers, who in nothing have deviated from the fellowship of the Holy Roman Church, nor have been separated from its faith and preaching; but have been partakers by the Grace of God of its communion unto the last day of their life, we decree to be read.”

Turrecremata says, “It is to be believed that the Roman Pontiff is directed by the Holy Ghost in things of faith, and consequently in these cannot err; otherwise anyone might as easily say that there was error in the choice (or discernment) of the four Gospels, and of the canonical epistles, and of the books of other doctors, approving some, and disapproving others; which, however, we read, and as is evident, was determined by the Roman Pontiffs Gregory and Gelasius.”  Again, he says, “The sixth kind of Catholic truths are those which are asserted by doctors, approved by the Universal Church for the defense of the faith and the confutation of heretics. … This is evident: for since the Church, which is directed by the Holy Ghost, approves certain doctors, receiving their doctrine as true, it necessarily follows that the doctrine of such (writers), delivered by way of assertion, and never otherwise retracted, is true and ought to be held by all the faithful with firm belief, in so far as it is received by the Universal Church; otherwise, the Universal Church would appear to have erred in approving and accepting their doctrine as true, which however was not true.”

And Stapleton lays down, “Bishops … when they treat of the Scripture as doctors, have not this certain and infallible authority of which we are speaking: until their treatises, approved by sacred authority, are commended by the Church as Catholic and certainly orthodox interpretation, which Gelasius first did,” etc.

I will give one more example, as it is eminently in point.

The Church has approved in a special manner the works of St. Augustine as containing the true doctrines of grace against the Pelagian and semi-Pelagian heresies.

In this particular, his works have been declared to be orthodox by St. Innocent I., St. Zosimus, St. Boniface I., St. Celestine, St. Hormisdas, St. Felix IV., and Boniface II.  For that reason Clement XI. justly condemned the book of Launoy called “Véritable tradition de l’Eglise sur la Prédestination et la Grâce,” etc., as “at least impious and blasphemous, and injurious to St. Augustine, the shining light and chief doctor of the Catholic Church; as also to the Church itself and to the Apostolic See.”

Now, in this approbation the Church approved the doctrine of St. Augustine, not only in the sensus qualis but also in the sensus quis; that is, it approved not only a possible theological sense which was orthodox, but the very and grammatical sense of the text.  It was therefore a true doctrinal judgment as to a dogmatic fact.

For, as Cardinal Gerdil argues, the doctrine of St. Augustine was proposed by the Church as a rule of faith against the Pelagian and semi-Pelagian errors.  “When it is said that the doctrine of St. Augustine in the matter of grace was adopted by the Church, it must not be understood in the sense as if St. Augustine had worked out a peculiar system for himself, which the Church then adopted as its own. … “The great merit of St. Augustine is, that with marvelous learning he expounded and defended the ancient belief of the faithful.”  The Church infallibly discerned the orthodoxy of his writings, and approving them, commended them as a rule of faith.

If the Church have this infallible discernment of the meaning, grammatical and theological, of orthodox texts, it has eodem intuitu the same discernment of heterodox texts.  For the universal practice of the Church in commending the writings of orthodox, and of condemning those of heterodox authors, is a part of the doctrinal authority of the Church in the custody and defense of the faith.  It falls therefore within the limits of its infallibility.

The commendation of the works of St. Augustine, and the commendation of the Thalia of Arius at Nicea, of the Anathematisms of Nestorius at Ephesus, and of the Three Chapters of Ibas, Theodore, and Theodoret, in the Second Council of Constantinople, all alike involved a judgment of dogmatic facts.

The subterfuge of the Jansenists as to the literal meaning of “Augustinus” came too late.  The practice of the Church and the decrees of Councils had already pronounced its condemnation.

(4.) What has here been said of the condemnation of heretical texts, is equally applicable to the censures of the Church.

The condemnation of propositions is only the condemnation of a text by fragments.

The same discernment which ascertains the orthodoxy of certain propositions, detects the heterodoxy of those which are contradictory.  And in both processes that discernment is infallible.  To define doctrines of faith, and to condemn the contradictions of heresy, is almost one and the same act.  The infallibility of the Church in condemning heretical propositions is denied by no Catholic.

In like manner, the detection and condemnation of propositions at variance with theological certainty is a function of the same discernment by which theological certainty is known.  But the Church has an infallible discernment of truths which are theologically certain; that is, of conclusions resulting from two premises of which one is revealed and the other evident by the light of nature.

In these two kinds of censures, at least, it is therefore of faith that the Church is infallible.

As to the other censures, such as temerity, scandal, offense to pious ears, and the like, it is evident that they all relate to the moral character of propositions.  It is not credible that a proposition condemned by the Church as rash should not be rash, and as scandalous should not be scandalous, or as offensive to pious ears should not be such, and the like.  If the Church be infallible in faith and morals, it is not to be believed that it can err in passing these moral judgments on the ethical character of propositions.  In truth, all Catholic theologians, without exception, so far as I know, teach that the Church is infallible in all such censures.  They differ only in this: that some declare this truth to be of faith, and therefore the denial of it to be heresy; others declare it to be of faith as to the condemnation of heretical propositions, but in all others to be only of theological certainty; so that the denial of it to be not heresy, but error.

To deny the infallibility of the Church in the censures less than for heresy, is held to be heretical by De Panormo, Malderus, Coninck, Diana, Oviedo, Amici, Matteucci, Pozzobonelli, Viva, Nannetti.  Murray calls it objective heresy.  Griffini, Herincx, Ripalda, Ferraris, and Reinerding do not decide whether it be heretical, erroneous, or proximate to error.  Cardenas and Turrianus hold it to be erroneous; Anfossi, erroneous, or proximate to error.  De Lugo in one place maintains that it is erroneous; in another, that to deny the infallibility of the Church in the condemnation of erroneous propositions, is heresy.  All, therefore, affirm the Church in passing such censures to be infallible.

The infallibility of the Church in all censures less than heresy may be proved from the Acts of the Council of Constance.  In the eleventh article of the Interrogatory proposed to the followers of Huss are included condemnations of all kinds.  They were asked whether they believed the articles of Wickliffe and Huss to be “not Catholic, but some of them notoriously heretical, some erroneous, others temarious and seditious, others offensive to pious ears.”  Martin V., therefore, in the Bull “Inter cunctos” requires belief, that is, interior assent, to all such condemnations made by the Council of Constance, which therein extended its infallible jurisdiction to all the minor censures, less than that of heresy.

In like manner, again, in the Bull “Auctorem Fidei,” the propositions condemned as heretical are very few, but the propositions condemned as erroneous, scandalous, offensive, schismatical, injurious, are very numerous.

During the last three hundred years, the Pontiffs have condemned a multitude of propositions of which perhaps not twenty were censured with the note of heresy.

Now in every censure the Church proposes to us some truth relating to faith or morals; and whether the matter of such truths be revealed or not revealed, it nevertheless so pertains to faith and morals that the deposit could not be guarded if the Church in such judgments were liable to error.

The Apostle declares that “the Church is the pillar and ground of the Truth.” (1 Tim. iii. 15.)  On what authority these words can be restricted to revealed truth alone, I do not know.  I know of no commentator, ancient or modern, who so restricts them.  On the other hand St. Peter Damian, Sixtus V., Ferré, Cardinal de Lugo, Gregory de Valentia, expressly extend these words to all truths necessary to the custody of the deposit.

This doctrine is abundantly confirmed by the following declarations of Pius IX.  “For the Church by its Divine institution is bound with all diligence to guard whole and inviolate the deposit of Divine faith, and constantly to watch with supreme zeal over the salvation of souls, driving away therefore, and eliminating with all exactness, all things which are either contrary to faith or can in any way bring into peril the salvation of souls.  Wherefore the Church, by the power committed to it by its Divine Author, has not only the right but above all the duty, of not tolerating but of proscribing and of condemning all errors, if the integrity of the faith and the salvation of souls should so require.  On all philosophers who desire to remain sons of the Church, and on all philosophy, this duty lies, to assert nothing contrary to the teachings of the Church, and to retract all such things when the Church shall so admonish.  The opinion which teaches contrary to this we pronounce and declare altogether erroneous, and in the highest degree injurious to the faith of the Church, and to its authority.”

From all that has been said, it is evident that the Church claims no jurisdiction over the processes of philosophy or science, except as they bear upon revealed truths; nor does it claim to intervene in philosophy or science as a judge or censor of the principles proper to such philosophy or science.  The only judgment it pronounces regards the conformity or variance of such processes of the human intelligence with the deposit of faith, and the principles of revealed morality; that is, in order to the end of the infallible office, namely, the guardianship of Divine revelation.

I will not here attempt to enumerate the subject matters which fall within the limits of the infallibility of the Church.  It belongs to the Church alone to determine the limits of its own infallibility.  Hitherto it has not done so except by its acts, and from the practice of the Church we may infer to what matter its infallible discernment extends.  It is enough for the present to show two things:

1. First, that the infallibility of the Church extends, as we have seen, directly to the whole matter of revealed truth, and indirectly to all truths which though not revealed are in such contact with revelation that the deposit of faith and morals cannot be guarded, expounded, and defended without an infallible discernment of such unrevealed truths.

2. Secondly, that this extension of the infallibility of the Church is, by the unanimous teaching of all theologians, at least theologically certain; and, in the judgment of the majority of theologians, certain by the certainty of faith.

Such is the traditional doctrine respecting the infallibility of the Church in faith and morals.  By the definition of the Vatican Council, what is traditionally believed by all the faithful in respect to the Church is expressly declared of the Roman Pontiff.

Scope of Catholic Assent

Pope Pius IX, Tuas Libenter, 1863 (Denzinger 1682-84)

Indeed, We honor with due praise the men of this same convention because, rejecting, as We think, the false distinction between philosopher and philosophy, about which We have spoken in our other letter to you [Gravissimas Inter, 1862], they have realized and professed that all Catholics in their learned interpretations should in conscience obey the dogmatic decrees of the infallible Catholic Church.

While, in truth, We laud these men with due praise because they professed the truth which necessarily arises from their obligation to the Catholic faith, We wish to persuade Ourselves that they did not wish to confine the obligation, by which Catholic teachers and writers are absolutely bound, only to those decrees which are set forth by the infallible judgment of the Church as dogmas of faith to be believed by all.  And We persuade Ourselves, also, that they did not wish to declare that that perfect adhesion to revealed truths, which they recognized as absolutely necessary to attain true progress in the sciences and to refute errors, could be obtained if faith and obedience were given only to the dogmas expressly defined by the Church.  For, even if it were a matter concerning that subjection which is to be manifested by an act of divine faith, nevertheless, it would not have to be limited to those matters which have been defined by express decrees of the ecumenical Councils, or of the Roman Pontiffs and of this See, but would have to be extended also to those matters which are handed down as divinely revealed by the ordinary teaching power of the whole Church spread throughout the world, and therefore, by universal and common consent are held by Catholic theologians to belong to faith.

But, since it is a matter of that subjection by which in conscience all those Catholics are bound who work in the speculative sciences, in order that they may bring new advantages to the Church by their writings, on that account, then, the men of that same convention should recognize that it is not sufficient for learned Catholics to accept and revere the aforesaid dogmas of the Church, but that it is also necessary to subject themselves to the decisions pertaining to doctrine which are issued by the Pontifical Congregations, and also to those forms of doctrine which are held by the common and constant consent of Catholics as theological truths and conclusions, so certain that opinions opposed to these same forms of doctrine, although they cannot be called heretical, nevertheless deserve some theological censure.

Pope Pius IX, Syllabus of Errors, 1864 (Denz. 1722)

Condemned Proposition:

21. The obligation by which Catholic teachers and writers are absolutely bound is restricted to those matters only which are proposed by the infallible judgment of the Church, to be believed by all as dogmas of faith.

Pope Leo XIII, Sapientiae Christianae, 1890, ¶ 24

In defining the limits of the obedience owed to the pastors of souls, but most of all to the authority of the Roman Pontiff, it must not be supposed that it is only to be yielded in relation to dogmas of which the obstinate denial cannot be disjoined from the crime of heresy.  Nay, further, it is not enough sincerely and firmly to assent to doctrines which, though not defined by any solemn pronouncement of the Church, are by her proposed to belief, as divinely revealed, in her common and universal teaching, and which the Vatican Council declared are to be believed with Catholic and divine faith.  But this likewise must be reckoned amongst the duties of Christians, that they allow themselves to be ruled and directed by the authority and leadership of bishops, and above all of the Apostolic See.  And how fitting it is that this should be so any one can easily perceive.  For the things contained in the divine oracles have reference to God in part, and in part to man, and to whatever is necessary for the attainment of his eternal salvation.  Now, both these, that is to say, what we are bound to believe, and what we are obliged to do, are laid down, as we have stated, by the Church using her divine right, and in the Church by the supreme Pontiff.  Wherefore it belongs to the Pope to judge authoritatively what things the sacred oracles contain, as well as what doctrines are in harmony, and what in disagreement, with them; and also for the same reason, to show forth what things are to be accepted as right, and what to be rejected as worthless; what it is necessary to do and what to avoid doing, in order to attain eternal salvation.  For, otherwise, there would be no sure interpreter of the commands of God, not would there be any safe guide showing man the way he should live.

Pope Pius XI, Casti Connubii, 1930, nn. 103-104

[I]n order that no falsification or corruption of the divine law but a true genuine knowledge of it may enlighten the minds of men and guide their conduct, it is necessary that a filial and humble obedience towards the Church should be combined with devotedness to God and the desire of submitting to Him.  For Christ Himself made the Church the teacher of truth in those things also which concern the right regulation of moral conduct, even though some knowledge of the same is not beyond human reason.  For just as God, in the case of the natural truths of religion and morals, added revelation to the light of reason so that what is right and true, “in the present state also of the human race may be known readily with real certainty without any admixture of error” (Vatican Council, sess. 3, chap. 2), so for the same purpose he has constituted the Church the guardian and the teacher of the whole of the truth concerning religion and moral conduct; to her therefore should the faithful show obedience and subject their minds and hearts so as to be kept unharmed and free from error and moral corruption, and so that they shall not deprive themselves of that assistance given by God with such liberal bounty, they ought to show this due obedience not only when the Church defines something with solemn judgment, but also, in proper proportion, when by the constitutions and decrees of the Holy See, opinions are prescribed and condemned as dangerous or distorted (Vatican Council, sess. 3, chap. 4; Code of Canon Law, c. 1324).

Wherefore, let the faithful also be on their guard against the overrated independence of private judgment and that false autonomy of human reason.  For it is quite foreign to everyone bearing the name of a Christian to trust his own mental powers with such pride as to agree only with those things which he can examine from their inner nature, and to imagine that the Church, sent by God to teach and guide all nations, is not conversant with present affairs and circumstances; or even that they must obey only in those matters which she has decreed by solemn definition as though her other decisions might be presumed to be false or putting forward insufficient motive for truth and honesty.  Quite to the contrary, a characteristic of all true followers of Christ, lettered or unlettered, is to suffer themselves to be guided and led in all things that touch upon faith or morals by the Holy Church of God through its Supreme Pastor the Roman Pontiff, who is himself guided by Jesus Christ Our Lord.

The Galileo Episode

Orestes Brownson, The Literary Policy of the Church of Rome, 1845, pp. 541-47

Now, the pope acts in three separate capacities, — as temporal prince, as bishop of the particular church of Rome, and as head of the church universal.  If he was regarded as infallible as a man, if infallibility was regarded as inhering in him as a personal attribute, he would be held, inasmuch as he is one and the same man in whichever capacity he acts, equally infallible in all three of these capacities, as Protestants commonly suppose Catholics do hold.  But Catholics do not hold the pope to be infallible as a man; as a man, or when acting in any case in which he has not the express promise of Christ to protect him from error and to guide him to the truth, they believe him just as liable to err, after becoming pope, as he was before.  The promise of Christ, which is the pledge of infallibility, is made, as we have said, only to the church universal, and therefore to the pope only when representing, and only in so far as he represents, the universal church.  But the pope, as temporal prince, as the civil ruler of the ecclesiastical states, or as the bishop of the see of Rome, does not represent the universal church, and therefore in these capacities has no promise of inerrancy.

These distinctions made, it will be proper and necessary to ask, when any particular act assumed to be reprehensible is alleged to have been done by the Catholic Church, and therefore by infallible authority, Has it been done or sanctioned by a universal council, or the great body of bishops?  Or has it been done or sanctioned by the pope, deciding ex cathedra, as the representative of the church universal?  If not, it has been done, has been sanctioned, by no authority held by a Catholic to be infallible; and, if bad, it must, as in all other cases, be charged to human fallibility or depravity.

Now, the reviewer alleges, or virtually alleges, that the heliocentric theory has been condemned as a heresy by an authority which Catholics hold to be infallible; for this is the real purport of his allegation.  But this we deny.  First, because it is not the principle of the church to pronounce dogmatically on questions of pure science; and second, because no instance ever has been or can be adduced of her having so pronounced.  The Catholic recognizes no authority but that of the universal church, expressed in one or the other of the two ways we have specified, as competent to declare what is or not a heresy, or to declare an article of faith, or any question whatever; and there is no purely scientific question on which this authority, in either of the ways specified, has ever spoken.  Individuals in the church, eminent doctors and high dignitaries, may have spoken, some condemning one doctrine, and some another; but never any authority believed by any Catholic to be infallible, or which, according to the principles of his church, he is required to believe infallible.  And furthermore, the theory in question has never been condemned at all as a heresy.

… But the case of Galileo is in point; and, surely, you are not about to deny that?  Surely, you will not pretend to deny that Galileo was imprisoned in the dungeons of the Inquisition for teaching that the earth turns on its axis, and moves round the sun, — that his doctrine was pronounced by the church of Rome to be a heresy, and that he himself was forced to retract it, — and that the venerable old philosopher, rising from the posture in which he had made his abjuration, stamped his foot upon the ground, and exclaimed, “Nevertheless, it does move?”  The story is so well told, has been so often repeated, and has proved so serviceable to numerous pretenders, wishing to palm off their stupid dreams for some new discovery in the science of man or nature, especially to our phrenologists, neurologists, and Fourierists, that, we own, it seems almost a pity to spoil it by contradicting it; yet it is false, totally false from beginning to end, with not one word of truth in it.  We make this assertion on indubitable authority.

The heliocentric theory was publicly taught in Rome by the great Cardinal Nicholas Cusanus, who was born in 1401, and died in 1464, just one hundred years before the birth of Galileo; it was taught in the same city, in public lectures, by Copernicus, a Catholic canon, educated at Bologna, in Italy, and professor of astronomy at Rome, in 1500; and Leonardo da Vinci, in 1510, “connects the theory of the fall of bodies with the earth’s motion, as a thing then generally received.”  Cusanus was never disturbed for asserting “the earth moves, the sun is at rest,” but was created Cardinal by Nicholas V., who conferred on him the bishopric of Brixen; and he enjoyed the favor and confidence of four successive pontiffs, till the day of his death.  Copernicus was invited by the pope to assist in reforming the calendar, which he did; and, on his retiring from his professorship, the dignitaries of the church charged themselves with providing for him a safe and honorable retreat, where, above the wants and distractions of life, he might devote the undivided energies of his great mind to the reconstruction of the whole fabric of astronomy.  When it is known at Rome that his system is prepared, Cardinal Schomberg writes to him, urging him to publish it, and generously offers to advance from his private purse the necessary funds.  The cardinal unhappily dying before the publication, another dignitary of the church, Gisius, Bishop of Kulm, steps forward to replace him; and when the work is brought to light, it is dedicated to Pope Paul III., with the pope’s approbation.  Thus did Rome originate, foster, and mature this heretical theory, and thus did she treat its advocates for more than eighty years before Galileo.  If it was a heresy, why was it so long tolerated?  If Rome was opposed to science, why did she protect and honor its cultivators?  And how happens it, that in the case of Galileo alone, who broached no novelty, who brought out no new theory, she suddenly became a persecutor?  The fairer presumption would be, that Galileo, if condemned at all, was condemned for something extraneous to his simple promulgation of the heliocentric theory, so formally taught, eighty years, nay, a hundred years, before, by Copernicus, in Rome herself.

But Galileo was not condemned for teaching this theory, nor was the theory itself condemned, nor was Galileo ever imprisoned, or required to retract his doctrine.  What, then, are the real facts in the case?  It appears, that Galileo, by the manner in which he proclaimed his theory, his intemperance in advocating it, and his attempt to reconcile it with the Scriptures, created him many enemies, who sought, in 1615, to get him cited before the Inquisition, but without effect.  No censure was passed upon him or his doctrine; he was simply required to speak as a mathematician, to confine himself to his discoveries and his scientific proofs, without meddling with the Scriptural question.  But with this Galileo was not satisfied.  He insisted on two things, — first, that his doctrine was demonstrated, and second, that it was supported by Scripture; and he came of his own accord to Rome, in 1616, to obtain a decision of these two points in his favor.  There was no charge against him, he was not cited to appear, but he came of his own accord, because he wished to obtain the sanction of Rome to his theories.  The court of Rome was unwilling to interfere; but, at length, yielding to the importunities of Galileo and his friends, the pope finally referred the question to the Inquisition, who decided the two points against Galileo; that is, they decided that the doctrine was not demonstrated and not supported by Scripture, — for these were the simple points before them, — and enjoined it upon Galileo not to teach it henceforth as a theory demonstrated, and to observe silence as to the Scriptural question.  This would still have left him free to teach it as an hypothesis, and to have adduced every mathematical proof in its favor in his power.  But Galileo was not content with this, which left him full liberty as a scientific man, and he was therefore forbidden to teach the doctrine at all.  This, as nearly as we can seize it, is the purport of the decision of the Inquisition in 1616.  But there was in this no positive condemnation of the doctrine, and no retraction of it required.  Galileo was still honored at Rome; and when his friend, Cardinal Barberini, became Pope Urban VIII., he came to Rome again, was received with the highest honors, and the pope bestowed a pension on him and his son.

For seventeen years after this decision in 1616, Galileo continued his mathematical pursuits, undisturbed, with the greatest success, receiving everywhere honor and applause, and nowhere more than at Rome.  Cardinal Barberini, who dissented from the decision of the Inquisition, became Pope Urban VIII.  He was the friend of Galileo, and not opposed to the heliocentric theory.  Galileo’s friends under this pope were everywhere encouraged and promoted, and it seemed that one needed only to advocate his doctrine to be sure of the pope’s favor.  Galileo was elated, and published his Dialogues, in which he brings out the theory, contrary to the obligation he had taken, and in a manner the most intemperate, and the most satirical and contemptuous to authority.  He was accordingly cited in 1633 to appear at Rome, and was condemned, — the question turning on his contempt for authority, and not at all on the truth or falsity of his doctrine.  What punishment was imposed upon him we do not know.  But he was not imprisoned.  While at Rome, he resided in the palace of his friend, the Tuscan ambassador, and during the trial was subjected, at most, to a nominal confinement, — as Mr. Drinkwater, in his Life of Galileo, and Mr. Whewell admit, — for four days, in a splendid apartment in the palace of the Fiscal of the Inquisition.  Such are the main facts in the case, as simply and as briefly as we can narrate them.

The whole treatment of Galileo, so far as Rome was concerned, appears to have been singularly lenient and respectful.  All that was ever asked of him was, that he should be content to teach his doctrine as an hypothesis, not as a doctrine demonstrated, and confine himself to mathematical arguments and proofs of it, without meddling with the Scriptural bearings of the doctrine.  Had he been content to pursue a straight-forward course as a scientific man, no complaint would ever have been entertained against him, and no official action would ever have been taken.  His troubles all arose from his rashness; from his insisting that authority should sanction, as demonstrated, what was as yet only a probable hypothesis; for we must remember, that, in 1616, the heliocentric theory was very far from being demonstrated.  It is true, Galileo’s own discovery of the phases of Venus went far towards demonstrating it; but these he himself did not insist upon, and he relied for his demonstration almost solely on the flux and reflux of the tides.  Bacon, the contemporary of Galileo, rejects the doctrine; and Milton, at a later period, seems to entertain, to say the least, strong doubts of its truth.  Tycho Brahe rejected it, and constructed another theory, on Scriptural grounds, in opposition to it, which was for a time very popular with Protestants, but is now universally exploded; and the historians of astronomy will tell us, that it was nearly a hundred years after Galileo before anyone had a right to say the theory was demonstrated.

But was not the doctrine condemned as heresy?  No.  The words “heretical,” “heresy,” in the condemnation of 1633, are, says the Dublin Review, but the stylus curiae; the evidence is most decisive, that of the pontiff in whose name it issued, and of the person condemned addressing his very judges.  “No!” says Urban, “the church has not condemned that system, nor is it to be considered as heretical, but only as rash.”  Galileo himself, standing before the Inquisition in 1633, speaks of it with the approbation of the court, as of a doctrine condemned ad interim, that is, not to be taught in its absolute form till proved to be true.  Moreover, the Inquisition which uses the terms heretical, etc., in the decision in 1616, which is merely recited in the condemnation of 1633, is not an institution supposed by Catholics to be infallible, and its decisions have no promise of exemption from error.  It is merely a court of inquiry.  It has no power to make the law, nor even to declare what the law is, but simply to inquire whether, in a given case, the preexisting law has been violated.  Its having termed the doctrine heretical would not have made it so, unless it had been previously declared to be a heresy by the authority of the church, which it had not been; because heresy never consists in maintaining a false scientific theory, but in willfully departing from the faith.  It was never an article of faith in the church, that the earth is at rest and the sun moves.  Consequently, to maintain the contrary never was and never can be a heresy.  Furthermore, if the doctrine had been condemned as a heresy, the teaching of it as a mere hypothesis, even, could not have been permitted; for the church does not permit what she has declared to be heresy to be taught at all.  Yet the teaching of the doctrine as an hypothesis was permitted, as we have seen, in the case of Cusanus; as a scientific theory, in the case of Copernicus; and at the very moment Galileo was condemned, it was taught by the professor of astronomy, we believe, in the pope’s own university of Rome.  Evidently, therefore, it was not condemned as a heresy.  The sole difficulty concerning the question grew out of Galileo’s insisting on interpreting the passages of Scripture, which seem to teach the geocentric theory, so as to make them harmonize with the heliocentric.  This was deemed by his judges to be premature, to say the least, for it was unnecessary to disturb the received interpretation of these passages, till the theory itself was fully demonstrated on scientific grounds; and the attempt to do it could only scandalize those who rejected the theory, as they supposed, for scientific reasons.  They said to Galileo, Go on and establish your theory on scientific grounds, and when you have succeeded in demonstrating it as a science, it will be time enough to consider the Scriptural question; but till then, let the Scriptural question alone.  Had he followed this advice, which was recommended by his friends, and was all that his enemies asked, no difficulty would have occurred.  The troubles Galileo had did not, then, grow out of his advocating his scientific doctrine, but from the manner in which he advocated it, and the extraneous questions he mingled with it.  This condemnation by the court of Rome is, then, no evidence of hostility on the part even of the court of Rome, much less of the church of Rome, to science.  With these remarks, referring for details and references to authorities, to the pamphlet which we have cited, we dismiss the case of Galileo.  Had we room, we would retort the charge upon Protestants, which they have brought against Catholics.  Kepler was a Lutheran priest; but the Lutheran University of Tubingen, as Menzel informs us, condemned his doctrine as repugnant to the language of Scripture, and he was obliged to flee his country; and where did he find refuge?  As professor of astronomy, all Lutheran as he was, in a Catholic University.  The devotion of Protestants to science, and their readiness to adopt scientific discoveries, are admirably evinced in the case of the reformed calendar of Pope Gregory XIII., in 1582.  England refused to adopt it for one hundred and seventy years, until 1752; Sweden adopted the new style one year later, in 1753; and the German States not until 1776; preferring, as some one says, “warring with the stars to agreeing with the pope.”

More on the Galileo affair: Dublin Review, July 1838, pp. 72-116